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The US intervention in Somalia provided us with a stinging example of how people from one of the world's poorest
regions can confront a high-tech global superpower militarily and emerge with a measure of success. Such experiences
lead one to think about the nature of future war and particularly how the rapidly declining costs of emerging
technologies might empower those in the so-called "less developed" parts of the globe.[1]
Much of the current discussion of future war underappreciates or overlooks altogether several key effects of the
ongoing technological transformation. Those experts who assert that emerging information and computer capabilities
are producing a Revolution in Military Affairs may be generally correct, but it is something else entirely to assume that
this "revolution" inevitably favors today's developed nations.[2] As an example of such thinking, a recent issue of The
Economist, as well as an interesting new book by George and Meredith Friedman, appear to conclude that this
revolution will give the United States a virtually insurmountable advantage in future conflicts.[3]
One hopes that will be the case. All too often, however, we tend to underestimate opponents from disadvantaged
nations even though there are many instances in history--Vietnam and Somalia being clear illustrations--where lowtech opponents successfully dealt with advanced technology wielded by well-trained troops of highly developed
nations.
In that vein, there appear to be four dangerous myths in current thinking about 21st-century land warfare. Each will be
addressed in turn.
Myth #1: Our most likely future adversaries will be like us.
Many in uniform will insist that they are not laboring under this myth. But when one examines the literature coming
out of the US defense establishment, it all too often suggests that the United States foresees an adversary who thinks
more or less as we do and organizes his forces and employs his weapons accordingly. We seem to be preparing for an
opponent who will fight us essentially symmetrically, much as Iraq tried to do.[4] To the contrary, our most likely
future opponents will be unlike us in important respects; consequently, they will approach warfare from a different
perspective, perhaps a radically different one.
As Harvard professor Samuel Huntington might put it, future conflicts may well be clashes between civilizations, and
the moral, political, and cultural norms of our opponents will likely differ from those of the United States and the
West.[5] Within some of those civilizations another phenomenon is brewing: In a fascinating piece in the Summer
1994 issue of Parameters, Ralph Peters described what he called the rise of "The New Warrior Class," a multitude
which he contends "already numbers in the millions." Peters suggests that in the future, America "will face [warriors]
who have acquired a taste for killing, who do not behave rationally according to our definition of rationality, who are
capable of atrocities that challenge the descriptive powers of language, and who will sacrifice their own kind in order
to survive."[6]
Along similar lines, Professor John Keegan, perhaps the foremost military historian of our times, has observed that the
post-Cold War world is experiencing in Afghanistan, Somalia, the Balkans, and elsewhere the reemergence of
"warrior" societies. These are peoples, he says, who are psychologically distinct from the West, and whose young are
"brought up to fight, think fighting honorable, and think killing in warfare glorious." A warrior in such societies,

Keegan has written, "prefers death to dishonor and kills without pity when he gets the chance."[7]
Until now, many of these groups lacked the ability to coalesce in an effective manner. But the spectacular decline in
the cost of computers and communications technology has the potential to dramatically empower them. U.S. News &
World Report, for example, recently predicted that a new generation of communications satellites would inexpensively
link virtually every part of the globe. Importantly, the author noted that for "disadvantaged regions of the world . . . the
coming satellite communications revolution could be one of those rare technological events that enable traditional
societies to leap ahead."[8]
These new communication systems have the potential to unite like-minded peoples into what might be called
"cybertribes." An article in the Spring 1997 issue of Foreign Policy observes, "The Internet has already overrun
geographic borders, making possible the creation of virtual communities of shared interest that transcend national
borders."[9] Some of these "virtual communities" or cybertribes may be hostile to US interests. As a foreshadowing of
what may be to come, neo-Nazi and other hate groups already use the Internet to spread their ideology and to maintain
contact with their confederates.[10]
Furthermore, a key feature of these warrior societies is the often charismatic nature of the leadership elites. Direct
broadcast satellites, enhanced holographic "telepresence," and other multimedia techniques will enable such leaders to
leverage their charisma in a realistic way to enormous audiences spread over immense areas.
These cybertribes--or "streetfighter" nations as some analysts describe them[11]--could change the face of 21stcentury land warfare by waging what might be termed neo-absolutist war. This would be a vicious form of conflict
extending across the spectrum of warfare. It would differ from more traditional "total war" by, among other things, the
propensity of the aggressor to focus not on destroying military forces, but rather on shattering the opponent's will.
In doing so, these warrior-society, streetfighter nations would ignore the Western concepts of war, instead deeming
those outside the favored group as not entitled to humane treatment. Indeed, such an adversary would see the moral,
political, and cultural values of his opponent as asymmetries to be exploited whenever possible. In a sense, such
warfare has existed throughout the history of man, but information-age technology would modernize it (hence the term
"neo") and vastly expand its potential.
In such a scenario, future opponents would not hesitate to use brutality openly to exploit the growing aversion to
casualties that more and more shapes the political and military decisions of Western-style democracies.[12] Consistent
with neo-absolutist war, our enemies might seek to manipulate us through brazenly displayed barbarism. Why? For
the simple reason that it seems to work. Consider the reaction when Somalis dragged the body of a US serviceman
through the streets of Mogadishu, or when Chechens took civilians hostage at a Russian hospital,[13] or when Serbs
chained UN personnel to potential targets. Likely opponents might well believe that such strategies are an effective
way to coerce democracies--even if those democracies are, by orthodox military calculations, more powerful.
In short, the 21st century may bring to our door an unwanted new kind of land warfare, neo-absolutist war, total war
brutally waged by unconstrained enemies enfranchised by technology. The conflict in Chechnya might be a prototype.
Myth #2: We can safely downsize our military in favor of smaller, highly trained forces equipped with hightechnology weapons.
With the end of the Cold War the United States and many other nations appropriately downsized their militaries.[14]
Yet despite warnings from respected leaders,[15] some people insist that further reductions are still possible if the
smaller number of troops are well-trained and have high-tech weaponry.[16]
The problem is that technology will so "equalize" the battlefield that the expected comparative advantage which
smaller, well-trained, high-tech forces are supposed to provide will never be achieved. Technology will also allow a
foe to wage war on the cheap. For example, technology is supposed to give our forces an edge in training; but consider
that the dramatic advances in computerized teaching techniques also will make sophisticated instruction available at
low cost to the masses in less-developed areas. This instruction will not just address ways to learn to use or maintain
particular weapon systems,[17] but also methods to master actual tactical combat techniques. Sound far-fetched? In

the April 1997 issue of Wired magazine is a story that explains how a $49 computer simulation program is being used
to teach young Marines just such skills.[18] Furthermore, documents such as Joint Vision 2010[19] already suggest that
advanced but inexpensive personal information devices[20]--literally a computer-on-the-hip--will allow an
unprecedented degree of command and control over individual soldiers.[21] One step further leads to a vision in which
artificial intelligence combined with voice recognition systems will allow a relatively untrained soldier to access all
kinds of expertise and information anywhere on the battlefield.[22] Future adversaries may be able to create "virtual"
noncommissioned officers in this way, countering a significant advantage that US forces have long enjoyed.
More fundamentally, and perhaps quite surprisingly, future soldiers may not have to be all that well trained. New,
user-friendly software may enable soldiers with little formal education to operate complex weaponry. Indeed, some
militaries may abandon altogether equipment requiring highly skilled operators--manned aircraft for example--in favor
of fully automated systems such as fire-and-forget missiles, or low-tech versions of the cruise missile: business jets on
autopilot carrying a payload of biological agents.
Nor will US troops necessarily have a monopoly on the latest, high-tech weapons. Indeed, technology may "level" the
battlefield in this respect as well by allowing, as one expert put it, "relatively weak countries to leapfrog . . . to
battlefield superiority."[23] The are a number of reasons for this, including the fact that the expensive, militarilyunique research and development (R&D) base that allowed the United States and other First World nations to develop
superior weaponry for so much of the 20th century is unnecessary in the information age: a home computer might
suffice. What is more, a future foe could leverage the world's commercial R&D investments in those civilian systems
that intrinsically have military applications.[24] Fears already abound that commercially available technology may
allow low-tech unmanned aerial vehicles to become the "poor man's weapon of mass destruction."[25]
Clearly, because so many commercial uses of information and computer technology exist, no nation will long be able
to maintain a monopoly on the latest developments. Furthermore, even the manufacture of such systems is shifting to
less-developed areas to take advantage of low labor costs and other incentives. While it's unlikely that the World Bank
would finance a tank factory, it might support the development of a computer industry despite the warfighting potential
of such a dual-use infrastructure.
Most important, the United States and other First World nations are becoming ever more dependent upon commercial,
off-the-shelf technology. Consequently, we should expect that our adversaries will be buying much the same
technology on the open market.[26] Although information technology is touted as a means to get inside an adversary's
"decision loop,"[27] the reality is that a streetfighter or warrior nation unencumbered by Western-style procurement
regulations might easily be able to get inside our "acquisition loop" and field newer weaponry well before we finish
buying already obsolete equipment.[28]
Thus, with the training advantage neutralized by technology, and with adversaries armed with technology similar or
even superior to ours, success in 21st-century land warfare may depend upon the sheer numbers of combatants
engaged. This is an ominous challenge. It may even require an information-age draft, notwithstanding all the attendant
social upheaval, to produce enough soldiers to counter streetfighter nations and warrior societies willing to put
millions of technology-equipped citizens under arms. This is especially worrisome because warrior societies start out
with individuals generally fiercer, more tolerant of adversity, and more willing to endure physical hardship than the
typical Western conscript.
Myth #3: We can achieve information superiority and even dominance in future conflicts.
Even as Joint Vision 2010 insists that "we must have information superiority,"[29] the information explosion
engendered by new technologies may not let any combatant achieve superiority, much less dominance. One reason will
be the transformation of the media as it exploits the new technologies. We already know that the media can project
powerful images that can build or erode public support for a military operation.[30] Historically, however,
governments with a mind to do so have been able to exercise significant control over media access to war zones as
well as the dispatch of stories from battlefields.
That will seldom be the case in the future. One can envision "vertically integrated" news organizations with their own
surveillance satellites and self-contained communication systems that will allow them to function virtually

autonomously. Indeed, one firm, Aerobureau of McLean, Va., already can deploy a self-sustaining flying newsroom.
The aircraft is equipped not only with multiple, redundant satellite video, audio, and data communication links, but
also gyro-stabilized cameras, side- and forward-looking radars, and, believe it or not, its own pair of camera-equipped
remotely piloted vehicles.
Information technologies will empower news organizations to such a degree that virtually no significant observable
detail will escape their view, and huge interconnected databases will add tremendously to their data sources.[31]
Advanced software, along with a cadre of expert ex-military consultants, will enable them to fuse the raw inputs into
useful, real-time or near real-time reportage. With immense quantities of information available from the global media,
what need will there be for our future enemies to spend money building extensive intelligence capabilities? The media
will become the "poor man's intelligence service."
The media's ability to provide real-time battlefield reports independent of military control will likely create difficulties
for casualty-averse democracies. During the Gulf War we saw how gruesome photos of the so-called "highway of
death" undermined support for continuing the war, and those were pictures of the destruction of a brutal enemy force.
What should we expect when the bodies are those of our friends and relatives? Tomorrow's communication capabilities
may allow the families of soldiers to establish a "virtual presence" with them on the battlefield. When live media
reports combined with information from other high-tech sources begin to communicate the horrific shrieks and
terrifying sights of death and mutilation as it happens to a loved one in combat, the political pressure to terminate
hostilities at almost any price may become inexorable.
In addition to the information disseminated by the news media, information will spew from the proliferating--and
vulnerable--presence of personal cell phones,[32] laptop computers equipped with e-mail,[33] and fax machines that
troops themselves own and carry with them.[34] This avalanche of information will profoundly affect 21st-century
land warfare, particularly in the areas of discipline and operational security. As Newsweek observed more than five
years ago, "If soldiers can phone mom or the local newspaper from the middle of the battlefield, what are the
implications for maintaining military discipline or secrecy?"[35] The obvious answer is that both will suffer.
Added to these information sources, future adversaries will also be able to buy high-resolution commercial satellite
products on the open market.[36] Given all these information sources, a goal of seeking information "superiority," let
alone "dominance"[37] on 21st-century battlefields is unrealistic, even quixotic; instead, savvy militaries will focus on
developing doctrine and strategies for operating in an environment of information transparency or information parity.
Myth #4: Modern technology will make future war more humane if not bloodless.
It has become almost an accepted truth in the United States and many Western nations that information technologies
will allow wars to be waged virtually bloodlessly. In a scenario depicted in a 1995 Time magazine article, a US Army
officer conjured up a future crisis in which someone sitting at a computer terminal in the United States could derail a
potential aggressor "without firing a shot."[38] The officer visualized the foe's phone system brought down by a
computer virus, logic bombs ravaging the adversary's transportation network, false orders confusing his military,
propaganda messages jamming his television broadcasts, and our computer operator electronically zeroing out the
enemy leader's bank account. All of this is expected to cause the adversary to just give up.
Perhaps all of that is technologically possible. But perhaps technology will become so inexpensive that even relatively
poor nations will be able to afford redundancies that would severely reduce, if not eliminate, the likelihood of success
in cyber-attacks. We also seem to continually underestimate the ability of foes to devise low-tech ways to circumvent
high-tech capabilities. Shouldn't we expect that our targets will plan work-arounds for precisely this kind of cyberassault? Isn't it also possible that such an enemy might even develop a cell of operators who are equally
technologically sophisticated, perhaps trained in American universities, and who might beat us to the punch?
In any event, the officer in that Time article fundamentally misapprehends the nature of our most likely adversaries by
assuming that they would engage in the kind of cost-benefit approach to conflict that we frequently do. Maybe we in
the West at the end of the 20th century would be ready to give up on a military effort if phone or electrical systems
were disrupted or if our bank accounts were emptied. But it is a peculiarly naive bit of Western cultural chauvinism to

presume that an enemy in a future conflict would abandon his cause for such reasons. We cannot count on such
discomfiture deterring a warrior society or a streetfighter nation driven by a powerful sociological imperative and
acting under the spell of a charismatic leader.
In fact, future war may become more savage, not less so. An adversary waging neo-absolutist war could resort to a
variety of horrific actions (many, incidentally, of the low-tech variety) to offset and divert high-tech US forces. The
aim of these efforts would be to cause political difficulties for US national leaders dependent upon domestic and
international public support.
As just one example, consider the consequences if an adversary--relying on miniaturized communications devices to
maintain command and control--deliberately dispersed his forces into civilian areas.[39] His intent would be to
discourage high-tech attacks by raising fears that there would be a replay of the furor that followed the US bombing of
the Al Firdos bunker during the Gulf War. Recall that the unexpected civilian casualties from the F-117 strike on that
bunker led to a dramatic reduction in the raids on downtown Baghdad.[40] If killing civilians can complicate a
democracy's war effort, then those intent upon waging neo-absolutist war will not hesitate to induce "collateral
damage" situations.
Precision weapons will be no panacea in a high-tech war. Critical supply facilities as well as those communications
nodes that can't be miniaturized and dispersed may be buried below POW camps, schools, hospitals, and similar
facilities. Again the objective would be to deter high-tech attacks by playing on the legal and moral conundrums that
would arise, for example, in a situation where one could destroy an underground ammunition dump only by bombing a
hospital above it.[41]
Additionally, knowing the traditional US concern for POWs, an enemy might openly abuse them--especially female
prisoners--to create a political controversy that could benefit them by exploiting our cultural norms and values. This is
but another example of seeking an asymmetry in neo- absolutist war.
Finally, there is the issue of hostages[42]--some from third countries--who might be used as human shields[43] to try
to influence US war policy. The adversary's own people could be exploited: young boys could be conscripted into the
military to carry out atrocities;[44] thousands of civilians could be sacrificed in unique and gruesome psychological
ploys. An enemy could triumph if we fail to develop appropriate strategies and programs to deal with such a vicious
adversary made potent by emerging technologies.
Conclusion
We cannot be modern-day, anti-technology Luddites. We must, of course, take advantage of the latest technology and
incorporate it into our military forces. In doing so, however, we should constantly ask ourselves: what will a given
technology drive our adversaries to do?[45] That will be a key issue of 21st-century land warfare, and those who
carefully examine the answers will prevail on tomorrow's battlefields.
As we look to the future we must continually remind ourselves--and our decisionmakers--that war, notwithstanding its
technology, will remain the savage clash that it always has been. We will face adversaries who will not play by our
rules and, indeed, who see our values as vulnerabilities. As James F. Dunnigan noted in his recent book on future war,
"If the opponents are bloody-minded enough, they will always exploit the humanitarian attitudes of their
adversaries."[46] Make no mistake about it, technology cannot transform war into a genteel electronic exchange as
some hope. Video games are not the paradigm for warfare in the next century.
Moreover, we should not expect our enemies--and especially those of other cultures--to necessarily use technology in
the same way we do, or to employ high-tech weapons as we would. Perhaps in considering the effect of high
technology on warfare, it is worth recalling the words of Vice Admiral Charles Turner Joy from more than 40 years
ago: "We cannot expect the enemy to oblige by planning his wars to suit our weapons; we must plan our weapons to
fight war where, when, and how the enemy chooses."[47]
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